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THE JOCKS AND THE JUSTICE:  HOW 
SOTOMAYOR RESTRAINED COLLEGE 
ATHLETES 
PHILLIP J. CLOSIUS* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two judicial opinions have shaped the modern college athletic world.1  
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma2 declared the NCAA’s 
exclusive control over the media rights to college football violated the Sherman 
Act.3  That decision allowed universities and conferences to control their own 
media revenue and laid the foundation for the explosion of coverage and income 
in college football today.4  Clarett v. NFL held that the provision then in the 
National Football League’s (NFL) Constitution and By-Laws that prohibited 
players from being eligible for the NFL draft until three years from the date of 
their high school graduation was immune from Sherman Act liability because it 
was protected by the non-statutory labor law exemption.5  An earlier decision, 
Haywood v. NBA,6 declared the National Basketball Association’s (NBA)  
age-based draft eligibility rule an illegal group boycott and a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act.7   Therefore, at the time of the Clarett decision, the NFL was 
                                                          
* Phillip J. Closius is a Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.  A.B. University 
of Notre Dame (1972); J.D., Columbia (1975).  The Author wishes to express his appreciation for the 
research assistance of Jacob Deaven, University of Baltimore School of Law (2016) and James Hetzel, 
University of Baltimore School of Law (2015). 
1. Although this Article only deals with football and basketball, these two sports provide most of 
the income for college athletic departments and support almost all other college sports. Therefore,  
significant developments in those two sports can be fairly characterized as influencing all of collegiate 
athletics.  See Kristi Dosh, Does Football Fund Other Sports at College Level?, FORBES (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/05/05/does-football-fund-other-sports-at-college-
level/. 
2. See generally 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
3. Id. at 88 (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2016)). 
4. The NCAA case is beyond the scope of this Article. 
5. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). 
6. 401 U.S. 1204, (1971). 
7. Id. at 1205–07.  The Court in Haywood did not consider the non-statutory labor exemption.  
CLOSIUS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:30 PM 
494 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:2 
the only professional league that had age-based eligibility rules.8   
Young talent in sports fascinates the American public.  Bryce Harper and 
Mike Trout dominate discussion of the best all-around player in Major League 
Baseball.  Ginger Howard makes headlines as an eighteen-year-old member of 
the Ladies Professional Golfers Association.  Connor McDavid is an  
eighteen-year-old left wing drafted first by the Edmonton Oilers in the 2015 
National Hockey League Draft.  Leonard Fournette, a nineteen-year-old running 
back at Louisiana State University, makes the cover of ESPN and Sports  
Illustrated.  Karl-Anthony Towns and Jahlil Okafor dominate college basketball 
as freshmen and then become the first and third picks in the 2015 NBA Draft.   
However, collegiate football and basketball players are treated differently 
from athletes in all other sports in the modern legal reality.  Although Fournette 
is widely acknowledged as being NFL ready and he risks his earning potential 
with every carry, he cannot become an NFL player until a certain amount of 
time has passed since his high school graduation—maybe.  Article 6, section 
2(b) of the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) states:  
 
No player shall be permitted to apply for special eligibility for 
selection in the Draft, or otherwise be eligible for the Draft, un-
til three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended  
following either his graduation from high school or graduation 
of the class with which he entered high school, whichever is 
earlier.9  
  
As written, the provision does not give a player with three years of college 
football experience a right to enter the draft—it only allows him to petition for 
a special exemption.  Although no third-year player has in fact been denied, the 
college football player only receives unconditional eligibility for the draft three 
years after his high school graduation and the exhaustion of his college  
eligibility or four years after his high school graduation.10 
The NBA is kinder to young talent by providing both an unqualified and a 
shorter period of eligibility for its draft.  The NBA CBA provides that an eligible 
player must be at least nineteen years of age during the calendar year of the draft 
                                                          
8. Alan C. Milstein, The Maurice Clarett Story: A Justice System Failure, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U. 
L. REV. 216, 225 (2015). 
9. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 6, § 2(b) (2011), https://nflpaweb 
.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf 
[hereinafter NFL CBA].  
10. See The Rules of the Draft, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, http://operations.nfl.com/the-play-
ers/the-nfl-draft/the-rules-of-the-draft/ (last visited June 9, 2016).  However, because almost no player 
exhausts his eligibility in three years, this is, in effect, a four-year from high school graduation rule. 
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and at least one NBA season must have passed since the player’s high school 
graduation.11  The NBA CBA also states, “The player has expressed his desire 
to be selected in the Draft in a writing received by the NBA at least sixty (60) 
days prior to such Draft (an “Early Entry” player).”12  However, the NBA  
owners proposed in the collective bargaining process of 2011 that the age limit 
be raised to twenty years old.13  The proposal was not embodied in the final 
CBA.  However, new NBA Commissioner Adam Silver announced his support 
for increasing the draft eligible age to twenty in his first press conference as 
Commissioner.14  Colleges and universities continue to pressure the NBA to 
increase the age and number of NBA seasons since high school graduation for 
draft eligibility.15  Because the draft eligibility rule in both sports is now in-
cluded in the leagues’ respective CBAs, any change to either at this point would 
require the consent of the respective players’ unions. 
How are these restrictions valid?  Why can football and basketball players 
not earn a living with their skills—like every other athlete and American worker 
can?  The Clarett opinion, authored by then Second Circuit Judge Sotomayor, 
confirmed the validity of eligibility restrictions in the NFL (and by implication 
the NBA)16 and has not been seriously questioned since the date of the  
decision.17   The influence of the opinion is at least partly explained by its au-
thor’s appointment to the United States Supreme Court.   Judge Sotomayor held 
that the NFL’s eligibility requirements were immune from the Sherman Act be-
cause they fell within the purview of federal labor law.18  The Clarett opinion 
therefore never reached the antitrust analysis that produced the decision in 
Haywood.   
                                                          
11. NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art X, § 1(b)(i) (2011), http://nbpa.com/cba/ 
[hereinafter NBA CBA]. 
12. Id. art X, § 1(b)(ii)(F).  The CBA lists under section 1(b)(ii) a variety of circumstances that make 
a player eligible for the draft.  See id. art X, § 1(b)(ii).  Subsection (F) is the only one applicable to this  
Article. 
13. Michael A. McCann, Justice Sonia Sotomayor and the Relationship Between Leagues and  
Players: Insights and Implications, 42 CONN. L. REV. 901, 904 (2011).  The NBA has been pressured 
for years to raise the eligibility limits to two years from high school graduation and twenty years old.  
See id.  
14. Howard Beck, New Commissioner Adam Silver Argues Minimum Age of 20 Better for NBA, 
NCAA Games, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 15, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1961874-new-com-
missioner-silver-argues-minimum-age-of-20-better-for-nba-and-ncaa-games. 
15. Jake New, Done with One-and-Done?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.in-
sidehighered.com/news/2015/02/23/conferences-weigh-freshman-ineligibility-rule-basketball-players. 
16. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).  
17. The NBA adopted its current age-based draft eligibility restriction in its 2005 CBA.  Christian 
Dennie, From Clarett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption Argument Continues, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. 
& SPORTS L. 63, 74 (2007).  That CBA was finalized on July 29, 2005, fourteen months after the Clarett 
decision.  Id. 
18. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 125. 
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The stability of college football and basketball as currently constituted  
depends on continued acceptance of the Clarett opinion.  If the Clarett result is 
overturned, college basketball loses many of its young stars.  The effect on  
college football would be unprecedented as talented players could never play 
collegially or leave the college game whenever they wanted.  The impact on 
elite teams would be magnified, as the star players would be the most likely 
early departures.   Because most college athletic departments are dependent on 
the revenue from basketball and football,19 a decrease in income from those 
sports due to a lack of marquee players would affect the very existence of other 
collegiate sports. 
Clarett was, in fact, wrongly decided in 2004. The result it produced is even 
less defensible for the current NFL and NBA.  While the opinion saved college 
football and basketball, its legal reasoning is seriously flawed.  The failure to 
consider the relationship between the NFL and the NCAA constitutes its biggest 
deficiency.20  The NFL eligibility rule is much more that a restraint on a class 
of prospective players.  The restraint supports the financial structure of college 
football and saves each NFL team millions of dollars in developmental costs.  
This conspiracy inhibits entry-level competition in professional football and  
allows both the universities and the NFL to enjoy monopolistic profits at the 
expense of college football players.  The predatory effect of the NFL’s group 
boycott is even more pernicious when draft eligibility is denied to college  
players unquestionably ready to play in the NFL.  Their ability to profit from 
their skills is delayed strictly to protect the financial interests of the NFL and 
the NCAA Division I universities. 
 The second section of this Article briefly reviews the history of the  
non-statutory labor law exemption.  The third section describes both the district 
court and Second Circuit opinions in Clarett.  The fourth section argues that the 
Second Circuit misunderstood the nature of NFL’s eligibility rule and  
misapplied its sports law precedent.  The fifth section argues that Judge  
Sotomayor improperly applied what was effectively the preemption test  
employed in the seminal sports law case of Mackey v. NFL.21  The final section 
of the Article demonstrates that, if the exemption does not apply, the eligibility 
provisions do, in fact, violate the Sherman Act.  
                                                          
19. See Dosh, supra note 1. 
20. The Clarett case only concerned the NFL.  See generally Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124.  As such, this  
Article speaks mainly of the NFL.  However, all the legal analysis contained herein applies equally to 
the NBA. 
21. See generally 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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II.  THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR LAW EXEMPTION  
The non-statutory labor law exemption was created by the Supreme Court 
to effectuate the statutory exemption from antitrust liability provided by  
Congress for union activity.22  After Supreme Court decisions held that unions 
were a violation of the Sherman Act,23 the Clayton Act provided, in relevant 
part, that labor unions are not illegal combinations in restraint of trade.24   
Subsequently, the Norris-LaGuardia Act further restricted the equity  
jurisdiction of federal courts in matters involving a “labor dispute.”25   The  
Supreme Court expanded this exemption for unilateral union activity to include 
collectively bargained, joint management-labor agreements in Allen Bradley 
Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.26  
The Supreme Court later explained the nature of the exemption in Local Union 
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.: 
 
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours  
restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately  
related to wages, hours and working conditions that the  
unions’ successful attempt to obtain that provision through 
bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining in pursuit of their own  
labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in  
combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection 
of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the 
Sherman Act.  We think that it is.27 
 
Other Supreme Court cases indicated that the exemption would not apply if 
the union participated in the competitive interests of the employer28 or if the 
agreement restrained the business or product market to an extent not justified 
by a union’s fundamental interest in eliminating competition among employees 
regarding wages and working conditions.29 
The exemption only applies to complaints alleging violations of federal  
                                                          
22. United States v. Hutcheson, 310 U.S. 219, 236–37 (1941). 
23. See generally, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v.  
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).  
24. See generally Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2016).  
25. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104–05, 113 (2016). 
26. See generally 325 U.S. 797 (1945). This case created the non-statutory labor exemption. 
27. 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965) (footnote omitted). 
28. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665–66 (1965). 
29. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 
625–26 (1975). 
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antitrust statutes, most notably the Sherman Act.  The exemption’s application 
to lawsuits against employers by employees has primarily occurred in the  
context of sports litigation.30  Mackey v. NFL involved a lawsuit by NFL players 
against the league alleging that the Rozelle Rule was a violation of the Sherman 
Act.31  The Rozelle Rule allowed the Commissioner of the NFL to provide any 
team that lost a free agent player to another team with compensation that the 
Commissioner, in his sole discretion, determined to be appropriate.32 The  
players argued that the imposed compensation was a per se violation of section 
1 of the Sherman Act or, in the alternative, a violation of the Rule of Reason, 
which emanated from the same statutory provision.33  The Eighth Circuit  
expanded the exemption by initially ruling that the immunity applied to the 
CBA, not just the union, and therefore the NFL could also assert the exemption 
as the management signee.34  The opinion then delineated a three-part test for 
the exemption’s applicability: 
 
1.  “the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to 
the collective bargaining relationship”; and      
2.  “the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a  
mandatory subject of collective bargaining” (i.e., wages, hours, 
or terms and conditions of employment); and 
3.  “the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona 
fide arm’s-length bargaining.”35 
 
The Eighth Circuit then concluded that the Rozelle Rule did satisfy the first 
two criteria of its test but was not the product of bona fide arm’s length  
bargaining.36  Therefore, the NFL’s liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act 
needed to be assessed.37  The Mackey opinion then stated that the per se rules of 
section 1 should not be applied to the NFL given the uniqueness of professional 
                                                          
30. See Phillip J. Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a  
Maturing Sports Industry, 24 B.C. L. REV. 341, 348 (1983). 
31. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976). 
32. Id. at 610–11. 
33. Id. at 609–10.  
34. Id. at 612. 
35. Id. at 614 (citing Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 
(1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Smith v. Pro Football, 542 F. Supp. 462 (D.D.C. 
1976); Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 496–500 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). 
36. Id. at 615–16. 
37. Id. at 616. 
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sports as an industry.38  The Eighth Circuit finally concluded by holding that the 
Rozelle Rule violated the Rule of Reason liability standard of section 1.39  The 
Mackey three-part test delineating the exemption’s applicability has been 
adopted by other circuits.40    
The Supreme Court decided a post-Mackey case involving the exemption 
and professional football in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.41 In that decision, the 
Supreme Court resolved an issue that had confounded the Circuits—did the  
exemption apply to provisions unilaterally imposed by an employer after the 
expiration of the applicable CBA?  In negotiations to create a new CBA, the 
NFL and the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) had 
reached an impasse.42  The owners had proposed a developmental or practice 
squad, and the NFLPA wanted such players to be free to negotiate their own 
compensation packages.43  The NFL wanted to impose a set salary scale for all 
such players.44  Following impasse, the NFL unilaterally imposed its wage 
scale.45  Brown, a practice squad player, initiated an antitrust lawsuit against his 
team for refusing to bargain with him.46  The Supreme Court ruled against 
Brown by holding that the exemption continues after impasse as long as the term 
was the product of the collective bargaining process and the employer and union 
remained in a collective bargaining relationship.47  Although the Brown opinion 
does not cite the Mackey decision, the Brown description of the appropriate  
application of the exemption appears to mirror the three-part Mackey test: 
 
That conduct took place during and immediately after a  
collective-bargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was  
directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining  
process. It involved a matter that the parties were required to 
negotiate collectively.  And it concerned only the parties to the 
collective-bargaining relationship.48 
                                                          
38. Id. at 619–20. 
39. Id. at 622. 
40. See, e.g., Cont’l Mar. of S.F., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, Metal Trades Dep’t, 
817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 
1979); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403–04 (D.D.C. 1986). 
41. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
42. Id. at 235. 
43. Id. at 234. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 235. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 250. 
48. Id.  
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The first two sentences quoted refer to the term being a product of good 
faith bargaining.  The final two sentences incorporate the mandatory subject of 
bargaining and the aspect of only affecting parties to the relationship prongs of 
the Mackey test.  The Brown decision therefore expands the duration of the ex-
emption and appears to support Mackey as the test for the exemption’s 
applicability. 
III. THE DECISIONS IN CLARETT  
Maurice Clarett was a highly recruited high school running back who  
eventually chose to enroll at the Ohio State University (OSU).  He graduated 
from high school on December 11, 2001, and enrolled early at OSU.  Clarett 
lived up to his reputation by becoming the first freshman running back starter at 
the school since 1943.  He led his team to an undefeated season in 2002 and 
Ohio State’s first national championship in thirty-four years, beating the  
University of Miami in the Fiesta Bowl in January 2003.  Clarett was named 
Big Ten Freshman of the Year and the best running back in college football by 
The Sporting News.   However, Clarett was suspended by OSU and the NCAA 
for the entire 2003 football season because he accepted impermissible benefits 
in violation of NCAA rules.49  Clarett believed he would also be suspended for 
the 2004 football season.50  Having already missed his sophomore season, Clar-
ett feared that he would not be able to play football for two full years.  Such a 
long absence would diminish his value to the NFL.  Clarett then sued the league 
in an effort to be eligible for the 2004 NFL draft.51 
The district court properly stated that the lawsuit turned on three major  
issues: (1) Did the non-statutory labor law exemption preempt the lawsuit  
because federal labor policy provided antitrust immunity for the eligibility  
restrictions at issue?; (2) If not, did Clarett lack standing because he had not 
suffered an antitrust injury?; and (3) If Clarett has standing, do the eligibility 
restrictions satisfy the Rule of Reason test imposed in sports cases to determine 
antitrust liability?52  The district court answered all of these questions in the 
negative and granted summary judgment in favor of Clarett.53 
In determining the reach of the exemption, the district court cited the  
                                                          
49. Clarett Allowed to Keep Scholarship, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2003), http://espn.go.com/college-foot-
ball/news/story?id=1612990. 
50. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 382.   
53. Id.  
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three-part test enunciated in Mackey.54  The opinion noted that the eligibility 
rules were not mandatory subjects of bargaining because the rule at issue  
precluded players from entering the labor market and therefore “affects wages 
only in the sense that a player subject to the Rule will earn none.”55  The district 
court also stated, “The exemption is also inapplicable because the Rule only 
affects players, like Clarett, who are complete strangers to the bargaining  
relationship.”56  Finally, the opinion concluded “the NFL has failed to  
demonstrate that the Rule evolved from arm’s-length negotiations between the 
NFLMC and the NFLPA.”57  The rule did not arise from, nor was agreed to 
during, the process of collective bargaining.58  The eligibility rule therefore 
failed all three prongs of the Mackey test and the exemption was inapplicable.59 
The district court then determined that Clarett suffered an antitrust injury 
and therefore had standing.60  His allegation that a group boycott precluded him, 
and all others similarly situated, from competing for a job in a defined market 
satisfied the injury requirement.61  Clarett also explicitly alleged that the  
restraint at issue resulted from conduct by the defendants.62  Clarett had standing 
because he was not alleging that he had lost an employment opportunity 
 to another in a competitive job market.63  He alleged that he and others like him 
“have been foreclosed from entering the market altogether.  ‘They are not losers 
in a competitive marketplace; they are not even allowed in the game.’”64  The 
injury should be more pronounced for players like Clarett who are  
unquestionably qualified to play in the NFL.65  The NFL’s enforced delay is the 
injury.66  
The district court then turned to the final issue described above—judging 
the viability of the eligibility rule pursuant to the Rule of Reason test under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.67  Under such an analysis, the plaintiff must show 
                                                          
54. Id. at 391. 
55. Id. at 395. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 396. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 397. 
60. Id. at 403–04. 
61. Id. at 403. 
62. Id.  
63. See id. 
64. Id. at 400 (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Football 
League’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379). 
65. See id. 
66. See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401.  
67. Id. at 404–07. 
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an actual adverse effect on competition.68  If successful, the defendant may then 
demonstrate the pro-competitive benefits of their activity.69  If defendants are 
successful, the plaintiff may then show that said benefits could be achieved by 
less restrictive alternatives—activities less harmful to competition.70  Clarett 
met his burden by alleging that the group boycott at issue adversely restrained 
trade by the NFL’s denial of market entry to certain sellers of services (i.e., 
players less than three years removed from high school graduation) in the  
market of professional football.71  The NFL then offered four justifications for 
the eligibility rule based on protecting younger players and reducing its costs.72  
The district court dismissed the protection of younger player rationales out of 
hand by noting that, while there may be concerns, they have nothing to do with 
promoting competition in the market.73  The economic justifications also failed 
because the NFL’s desire to keep its costs down was not pro-competitive in any 
way—in fact, most antitrust violations are done because they inure to the  
financial benefit of the defendants.74  The district court concluded by noting 
that, even if the justifications were pro-competitive, the ability to screen and test 
candidates for the NFL draft was a less restrictive alternative for accomplishing 
all the proffered justifications.75      
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court on the exemption 
issue and therefore did not reach the antitrust issues contained in the district 
court opinion.76  The opinion began by characterizing the NFL as a  
multi-employer bargaining unit, an arrangement both provided for and  
promoted by federal labor law.77  The court then reviewed the history of the 
non-statutory labor law exemption and the applicable Supreme Court  
precedent.78  Judge Sotomayor then decided that the Mackey test was not  
appropriate for use in a case alleging a restraint on a labor market brought by 
employees rather than a restraint on a product market brought by other  
employers.79  She specifically noted that Clarett did not contend that the  
eligibility rules worked to the disadvantage of the NFL’s competitors in the 
                                                          
68. Id. at 404.  
69. Id. at 405.  
70. Id. at 405–06. 
71. Id. at 406. 
72. Id. at 408. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 408–09. 
75. Id. at 410. 
76. See generally  Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
77. Id. at 130. 
78. See generally id. at 130–34. 
79. Id. at 133–34. 
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market for professional football or in some manner to protect the NFL’s  
dominance in that market.80  The opinion then stated that the Mackey test should 
not be applied when “the plaintiff complains of a restraint upon a unionized 
labor market characterized by a collective bargaining relationship with a  
multi-employer bargaining unit,”81 to which Judge Sotomayor cited Wood v. 
NBA,82 Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass’n,83 NBA v. Williams,84 and Brown 
v. Pro Football, Inc.85 to support this conclusion. 
The Second Circuit then described the issue as “whether subjecting the 
NFL’s eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny would ‘subvert fundamental  
principles of our federal labor policy.’”86  A base principle of federal labor law 
was that, once a bargaining relationship was established, “prospective players 
no longer have the right to negotiate directly with the NFL teams over the terms 
and conditions of their employment.”87  Labor policy meant that “the NFL teams 
are permitted to engage in joint conduct with respect to the terms and conditions 
of players’ employment as a multi-employer bargaining unit without risking  
antitrust liability.”88  The terms and conditions of Clarett’s employment were 
therefore committed to the collective bargaining process in which the NFLPA 
has the labor law right to make concessions as it sees fit and to favor veterans 
over rookies if such a choice benefits the unit and is consistent with a union’s 
duty of fair representation.89  However, these general labor concepts were not 
controversial or actually in dispute in the lawsuit.   
The critical part of the opinion began with Judge Sotomayor overruling the 
district court by holding that the eligibility rule was a mandatory subject of  
bargaining.90  She first based this conclusion on her belief that the eligibility 
rule has “tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL 
players.”91  Proof of that effect was the complex collectively bargained for  
system of the NFL draft, salary pools for rookies, team salary caps, and free 
agency that combined to influence an individual player’s compensation.92  The 
                                                          
80. Id. at 134. 
81. Id.  
82. See generally 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
83. See generally 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995). 
84. See generally 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995). 
85. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
86. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 138 (quoting Wood, 809 F.2d at 959). 
87. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 138. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 139. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 140. 
92. Id.  
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second justification for the holding was the reduction in competition in the  
market for entering players caused by the eligibility rule, which, in turn,  
affected the job security of veteran players.93  “Because the size of NFL teams 
is capped, the eligibility rules diminish a veteran player’s risk of being  
replaced by either a drafted rookie or a player who enters the draft and, though 
not drafted, is then hired as a rookie free agent.”94  The Second Circuit noted 
that “the preservation of jobs for union members is not violative [sic] of the  
anti-trust laws.”95  The opinion finished its analysis of this issue by concluding 
that simply because the eligibility rules harmed prospective players rather than 
current players did not make them violations of the Sherman Act.96  Labor law 
rather than antitrust law must therefore control any challenge to a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, and labor law permitted the NFL and the NFLPA to agree 
that an employee will not be hired or considered for employment for nearly any 
reason whatsoever, which is not an unfair labor practice or an act of  
discrimination made illegal by statute.97    
The opinion concluded by noting that the exemption applies even though 
the eligibility rule was not contained in the CBA.98  The eligibility rule was in 
fact contained only in the NFL Constitution and By-Laws.99  However, the 
NFLPA certainly was aware of the eligibility rule and a copy of the NFL  
Constitution and By-Laws was presented to the NFLPA during negotiations.100  
Because the eligibility rule was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the NFLPA 
could have forced the NFL to bargain on it and, for whatever reason, it did not 
do so.101  In addition, the NFLPA agreed in the CBA to waive its right to  
challenge any provision in the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, effectively 
agreeing to the eligibility rule contained therein.102  Labor law precluded any 
individual player from challenging the unique bundle of compromises made by 
the union in the collective bargaining process that produced the agreement.103  
The Second Circuit therefore reversed the district court and remanded with  
                                                          
93. Id. 
94. Id. (citing Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective  
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1971)). 
95. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 140 (quoting Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. N.Y. Shipping 
Ass’n, 426 F.2d 884, 887–88 (2d Cir. 1970)).  
96. Id.  The court cited broad precedent establishing the validity of “hiring halls” as proof of its 
conclusion. Id. at 140–41. 
97. Id. at 141. 
98. See id. at 142. 
99. Id. at 127.  The 2011 NFL CBA does contain the modern eligibility rule in Article 6, § 2(b). 
100. Id. at 142. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See id. at 142–43. 
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instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the NFL.104  The opinion 
also vacated the order of the district court designating Clarett as eligible for the 
2004 NFL draft.105  
IV.  JUDGE SOTOMAYOR MISUNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE ELIGIBILITY 
RULE AND THE DRAFT IN THE NFL 
Clarett was only challenging the NFL’s eligibility rule, alleging that the 
group boycott that refused to consider him for the NFL draft until a certain year 
occurred violated the Sherman Act.  Clarett did not challenge the NFL draft 
itself, the rookie salary cap, the adequacy of his individual compensation, or any 
other term or condition of employment contained in the NFL CBA or the NFL 
Constitution and By-Laws.  Therefore, the Second Circuit was wrong to  
analogize Clarett to a disgruntled job applicant.106  He was not asking to be  
eligible for a job—he wanted to be eligible for the draft.  The draft is a  
procedure unique to professional sports.  Both the NBA and the NFL  
extensively scout all college players and medically examine and physically test 
all draft eligible players.107  Every NFL team knew who Clarett was and  
extensively scouted him during his one year at Ohio State.  Therefore, if Clarett 
had won his case, he would not have been guaranteed a job on an NFL team.  
He would have simply been subjected to the standard process of player  
evaluation that had already begun for him.  Clarett was not deluded about his 
qualifications or bitter about an imaginary slight that cost him a career  
opportunity.  Clarett would have been drafted in the early rounds of the draft if 
he was eligible.108  The NFL did not dispute that fact.  The NFL just arbitrarily 
told him that he needed to wait until the subsequent year’s draft and employed 
a group boycott to enforce its decision.   
A draft only has a predetermined number of selections.  The NFL draft has 
                                                          
104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. See id. at 141.  “But Clarett is in this respect no different from the typical worker who is 
confident that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not possess the qualifications or 
meet the requisite criteria that have been set.”  Id.  For an extensive critique on the inappropriateness 
of equating a uniquely qualified professional athlete to “a garbage man,” see Christian Dennie, Is  
Clarett Correct? A Glance at the Purview of the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 6 TEX. REV. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 1, 18–19 (2005). 
107. See Kurt Helin, NBA Draft Combine Starts Wednesday in Chicago... But What Does That 
Mean?, NBC SPORTS (May  14, 2014), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2014/05/14/nba-draft-combine-starts-
wednesday-in-chicago-but-what-does-that-mean/; Dave Siebert, An Inside Look into the NFL Medical 
Exam Process at the Combine, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 21, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/arti-
cles/1968230-an-inside-look-into-the-nfl-medical-exam-process-at-the-combine. 
108. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
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seven rounds with each team receiving one pick.109  Therefore, there will be 224 
players selected every year.110  The NBA draft has only two rounds with each 
team receiving one pick.111  Therefore, there will be sixty players selected every 
year.  The number of rookies selected is constant regardless of how many  
players are eligible to be drafted.  The CBAs do not expressly limit the number 
of undrafted rookie free agents a team may sign but effectively a ceiling is 
placed on that number due to roster limitations on the number of players a team 
may have under contract in the off season and the preseason training camp.  
Each NFL team may have a maximum of ninety players under contract during 
such period,112 and each NBA team may have a maximum of twenty players 
under contract during such period.113  Both numbers are constant and do not 
vary with the number of players eligible for the draft.  Teams in both leagues 
are customarily at the maximum for the beginning of preseason training camp.  
Therefore, had Clarett been eligible for the draft, his presence would not have 
increased the number of rookies entering the league.  He would have been added 
to a roster at the expense of another eligible rookie player.   
Judge Sotomayor compounded her misunderstanding by supporting her  
result with four sports law cases that were distinguishable from Clarett’s  
allegations—Wood, Caldwell, Williams, and Brown.114  Although each of these 
cases contributed significantly to the legal evolution of the non-statutory labor 
exemption, none of them dealt with an eligibility rule and only Wood involved 
a draft.115  The black letter law for which Judge Sotomayor cited them was not 
in dispute at the time of the Clarett decision or now.  However, no case holds 
that all group activity by a multi-employer unit is exempt from an antitrust  
lawsuit by a member of a labor group.  The cases indicate that some group  
activity by such a unit is exempt.  The application of the exemption is therefore 
fact specific.  The Second Circuit opinion does not explain why decisions  
unrelated to an eligibility rule should control the result in Clarett.116 
                                                          
109. NFL CBA, supra note 9, at art 6, § 2(a). 
110. It is possible for a few more players to be drafted in any given year because the NFL CBA 
provides for an additional round of compensation picks that provide compensation for any team losing 
an unrestricted free agent to another team. Id.  This provision provides for a maximum of thirty-two 
additional selections.  See id.  Many years produced no compensation picks.    
111. NBA CBA, supra note 11, at art X, § 3(a). 
112. Matt Verderame, NFL Roster Cut Deadlines and Rules, SBNATION (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2013/8/22/4647088/nfl-roster-cut-deadlines-rules-preseason. 
113. Larry Coon, Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap FAQ, NBA SALARY CAP FAQ, 
www.cbafaq.com//salarycap.htm#Q79 (last updated Mar. 20, 2016). 
114. See Dennie, supra note 106, at 14–17. 
115. See id. 
116. Judge Sotomayor states that the eligibility rule is part of the complex process of draft, salary 
caps, and other devices by which wages in the NFL are determined.  Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 
CLOSIUS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:30 PM 
2016] THE JOCKS AND THE JUSTICE  507 
In Wood, a drafted player sued the NBA, alleging that the NBA draft and 
the NBA salary caps lessened his individual compensation and therefore  
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.117  Wood argued that the exemption did 
not apply to his claims because the first prong of the Mackey test was not  
satisfied—the draft affected prospective players who had not signed an NBA 
contract and who were not yet a party to the collective bargaining  
relationship.118   The draft and salary caps were agreements among horizontal 
competitors to eliminate competition in the market of college players.119  The 
Second Circuit held that the exemption included the draft, salary cap, and other 
conditions of entry even if the union had effectively disadvantaged new union 
members to the betterment of senior union members.120  Labor law and the  
collective bargaining process therefore controlled the compensation limits and 
job assignments of players entering the NBA.121  However, the Wood challenge 
is not the one presented in Clarett even though the Clarett opinion treats it as if 
it were.  Clarett did not challenge the draft or any salary cap terms—in fact, he 
desperately supports them.  Wood was drafted and, after receiving a contract 
offer he considered inadequate, asked to be declared a free agent.  Clarett is 
denied the opportunity to be considered for the immediate draft in spite of the 
fact that he is not qualified to play football in the only other similar alternative 
available to him—college football.122 
In Caldwell, the plaintiff was the president of the players’ association for 
the American Basketball Association.123  He alleged that the league’s teams  
violated the Sherman Act by agreeing as a group to release him and boycott his 
playing services in retaliation for his activities on behalf of the union.124  The 
Second Circuit reasoned that the exemption should preclude Caldwell’s claim 
because his allegations concerned the mandatory bargaining subject of hiring 
and firing employees.125  His retaliatory discharge claims also involved activity 
                                                          
F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004).  The eligibility rule therefore cannot be viewed in isolation.  Id.  The fact 
specific nature of the exemption requires that the eligibility rule be viewed in isolation.  Id.  The  
complexity of various CBA terms is insufficient to override this requirement. Id. 
117. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 956–57 (2d Cir. 1987). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 958. 
120. Id. at 963.  
121. See id. at 962–63. 
122. Although the Canadian Football League is a professional league, the facilities, media exposure, 
and quality of are not equivalent to the NFL or major college football. See Rob Boffard, The  
Little-Known Canadian Version of American Football, BBC NEWS (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33324426. 
123. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F. 3d 523, 525 (2d Cir. 1995). 
124. Id. at 526. 
125. See id. at 528. 
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that was protected by federal labor law.126  Both of these claims were subject to 
appropriate labor law remedies.127  The exemption therefore applied and  
Caldwell should pursue redress in an appropriate labor forum and not seek  
compensation through antitrust litigation.128  The Caldwell fact pattern is  
unrelated to Clarett’s claims regarding the eligibility rule.  Caldwell was a  
distinguished veteran player who was not only a long-standing member of the 
bargaining unit but also president of the union.  The decision to prioritize labor 
law remedies over antitrust litigation was clearly justified by the Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion.  However, Caldwell does not, and should not, establish the prop-
osition that all joint or group activity by a multi-employer unit is exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny.  Caldwell does repeat the black letter law principle that some 
joint or group activity by a multi-employer unit is exempt from antitrust scru-
tiny.129  In the determination of whether Clarett’s allegations fall within the ex-
empt type of group activity, the Caldwell fact pattern is easily distinguishable 
and the Caldwell result should have been given limited applicability.     
In Williams, a class of current NBA players challenged the NBA’s draft and 
salary cap as a violation of the Sherman Act.130  The NBA CBA had  
expired, and the draft and salary cap were unilaterally implemented by  
management after negotiations with the players’ union had reached impasse.131  
The central issue in the case, therefore, was whether the exemption expired 
when the CBA terminated or whether it continued until some later date.132  The 
Second Circuit began its opinion by extolling the virtues of a multi-employer 
bargaining unit and its necessity in the efficient organization of the business and 
games of professional sports.133  Unilateral implementation by management of 
a union rejected term was permitted by federal labor law.134  Because the entire 
collective bargaining process was controlled in detail by labor principles, the 
Williams court held that antitrust liability for an employer was inappropriate and 
the exemption continued after the expiration of the CBA.135  Other circuits have 
also decided that the exemption survived impasse and continued as long as a 
collective bargaining relationship existed.136   
                                                          
126. Id. at 527–30. 
127. Id. at 530. 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 529–30. 
130. NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 685–86 (2d Cir. 1995). 
131. Id. at 686.  
132. Id. at 687–88. 
133. Id. at 689. 
134. Id. at 693. 
135. Id. 
136. See, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 
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In Brown, the Supreme Court agreed with the result in Williams and held 
that the exemption did immunize an employer from antitrust liability for  
unilaterally imposing proposed terms and conditions of employment after the 
expiration of a CBA and impasse with a union.137  The NFL unilaterally  
implemented a provision permitting each team to have a “developmental squad” 
of players who had been waived by the league.138  Such developmental players 
would not be able to negotiate their compensation individually but would all be 
paid a league-wide salary for each game on the squad.139  A class of  
developmental players challenged the imposition of a non-negotiable NFL  
payment as a violation of the Sherman Act.140  The Court echoed the Williams 
opinion by finding that allowing the imposition of antitrust liability after  
impasse would call into question much of the conduct of a multi-employer  
bargaining unit that was regulated in detail by federal labor laws.141  Federal 
courts ruling in an antitrust context should not be able to usurp the National 
Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) responsibility for policing the collective bar-
gaining process.142  The exemption therefore continued for as long as a collec-
tive bargaining relationship existed between an employer and a union.143  The 
Clarett opinion noted that Wood, Caldwell, and Williams were consistent with 
Brown and therefore would be regarded as controlling precedent.144  
Unfortunately, as the above analysis demonstrates, the four decisions cited 
by Judge Sotomayor were not directly relevant to the resolution of Clarett’s 
case.  While the Williams and Brown opinions were significant in defining the 
termination of the exemption, that issue was not raised by the Clarett facts. 
Caldwell’s holding that a retaliatory discharge claim was exempt from antitrust 
liability was equally inapposite to Clarett’s complaint.  Although Wood is the 
closest to relevance, his challenge to the draft and rookie salary cap provisions 
                                                          
F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.D.C. 1995).  The Powell result forced the NFLPA to decertify as a union and 
terminate its collective bargaining relationship with the NFL.  At that point, the exemption expired. 
137. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 240–42 (1996). 
138. Id. at 234–35. 
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 235. 
141. Id. at 237–42. 
142. Id. at 240–42.  Brown has been characterized as exempting a familiar multi-employer  
bargaining tactic regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining that is permitted and regulated by the 
NLRB.  See Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2010).  As such, the  
exemption protects activity that is essential to the collective bargaining process.  See id.  
143. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.   Years after the Brown decision, the NFLPA again decertified to 
ensure that the exemption did not apply to a threatened antitrust lawsuit and to increase its leverage in 
collective negotiations. League Locks Out Players After Union Decertifies, NFL (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81eb6e46/article/league-locks-out-players-after-union-de-
certifies. 
144. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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much more clearly involved terms and conditions of employment collectively 
negotiated by the league and union.  In fact, Judge Sotomayor specifically noted 
that Clarett does not argue that Brown cast doubt on Wood, Caldwell, or  
Williams.145  Both parties essentially agreed that the precedent cited held that 
some, but not all, group activities by a multi-employer unit are exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny.146  However, the cited cases did not provide any guidance as 
to whether the eligibility rule fell within the exempted activity parameters or 
not.    
By repeatedly characterizing the eligibility rule as a “criteria for player  
employment,”147 the Clarett opinion mischaracterizes the complaint at issue.  
Eligibility for the draft is not the same as eligibility for a job in the unique setting 
of professional sports.  Clarett was not asking for a job—he was asking for the 
chance to be tested.  Sotomayor’s analogy to a union hiring hall perpetuates the 
misconception.148  The hiring hall has been approved in certain multi-employer 
industries (“most notably maritime, longshoring and construction”) when a  
union acts essentially as a job referral service for union members on short-term 
employment.149  The employees serviced are union members and part of the 
bargaining unit.  The hiring hall has no relation to professional sports.  If an 
employer can be compared to a union-run entity, the NFL is essentially saying 
to prospective players “you are highly qualified and we have jobs but come back 
next year.”  That was the repudiated position of union hiring halls in the docks 
of New York and New Jersey when they were controlled by criminals in the 
1950s.150  No hiring hall would be permitted to foreclose workers on such a basis 
in modern America.151  Similarly, the NFL’s group boycott arbitrarily denied 
Clarett the chance to be turned down for a job (fully knowing he would not be 
turned down), which should not be allowed. 
V.  JUDGE SOTOMAYOR IMPROPERLY REJECTED THE MACKEY TEST AND THEN 
INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE MACKEY PRINCIPLES 
The district court applied the three-part Mackey test and found the  
eligibility rules failed to satisfy any of the Mackey factors.152  The Second  
                                                          
145. Id.   
146. See id. 
147. Id. at 141. 
148. Id. at 140–41. 
149. See Milstein, supra note 8, at 244. 
150. A position similar to a scene from the movie ON THE WATERFRONT (Horizon Pictures 1954). 
151. See Kevin W. Brooks, “Physically Ready to Compete": Can Players' Unions Bar Potential 
Draftees Based on Their Age?, 21 SPORTS LAW. J. 89, 122 n.221 (2014).  
152. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 133. 
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Circuit reversed the district court on this issue and explicitly rejected the Mackey 
test when a plaintiff’s allegations only claimed an anticompetitive  
effect on a collective bargained labor market rather than a product market.153 
However, the precedent cited by Judge Sotomayor does not support the  
inapplicability of Mackey in a labor market context.  The district court in Wood 
explicitly relied on the three-prong Mackey test in its analysis.154  The Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court opinion and never disagreed with the Mackey 
test applied by the lower court.155  In addition, the appeals court clearly discusses 
two of Mackey’s requirements—whether the rookies are parties to the collective 
bargaining relationship156 and whether the draft is a mandatory subject of  
bargaining.157  The Williams opinion also effectively utilizes Mackey  
concepts.158  The Second Circuit inferred that players not yet under contract 
were still part of the collective bargaining relationship.159  A significant amount 
of the opinion also deals with the characterization of the alleged restraints as 
mandatory subjects of bargaining.160  Finally, the Williams opinion cites Powell 
v. NFL161 favorably to support its conclusion.162  Powell is an Eighth Circuit 
decision that relied extensively on the Mackey test it previously created.163 The 
Clarett opinion also fails to mention that the Mackey test was explicitly utilized 
in labor market cases in the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.164  
Mackey is also consistent with Supreme Court precedent.  The Clarett  
opinion has a peculiar relationship with the non-Brown Supreme Court cases.  
Judge Sotomayor first states that these cases are of limited assistance in  
determining the reach of the exemption in labor market cases because they all 
dealt with antitrust injuries to employers.165  However, in determining the best 
alternative to Mackey, she cites a Second Circuit case that relies on the  
exemption principles of Jewel Tea.166  However, Judge Sotomayor also 
                                                          
153. Id. at 134. 
154. Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
155. See generally Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
156. Id. at 960. 
157. Id. at 962–63. 
158. See generally NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).   
159. See id. at 693.  
160. Id. at 691. 
161. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). 
162. Williams, 45 F.3d at 692–93. 
163. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1298–1300. 
164. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  See generally Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 
124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
165. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 134. 
166. Id. at 133 (citing Local 210, Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Labor Relations Div. Associated Gen.  
Contractors of Am., 844 F.2d 69, 80 n.2 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
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acknowledges the commonly accepted position that the three-part test in 
Mackey was specifically derived from Justice White’s opinion in Jewel Tea.167  
The opinion’s treatment of Brown is equally confusing.  The opinion frequently 
cites Brown as supporting its holding but also admits that Brown left the  
contours of the exemption undefined and expressed some reservations about the 
lower court’s broad reading of the exemption as insulating all labor market  
restraints from antitrust scrutiny.168  The Clarett opinion also fails to cite the 
actual test enunciated in Brown, which is analogous to the Mackey test.169  The 
Supreme Court precedent does not support the Clarett conclusion that the 
Mackey test should not be utilized in a case alleging only injury in the labor 
market. 
However, if Judge Sotomayor stated that Mackey was not to be utilized in 
Clarett, what test did she use instead of Mackey?  The opinion indicates that 
she, in fact, used Mackey test principles.  The decision begins by stating that the 
Mackey test is inappropriate and the first proper factor indicating the  
exemption should not apply is that the alleged restraint is in the labor market 
and not in the product market.170  However, this is simply a different way of 
formulating the first prong of Mackey—the restraint must primarily affect only 
those who are parties to the collective bargaining relationship.  If the activity at 
issue is affecting individuals or entities outside the bargaining relationship, the 
restraint is by definition in the product market.   The opinion then analyzes 
whether the eligibility rules are mandatory subjects of bargaining171—an  
inquiry identical to the second prong of Mackey.  Finally, the decision concludes 
by holding that the NFL’s Constitution and By-Laws (which contained the  
eligibility rule at the time of the appeal)172 were present at the collective  
negotiations between the NFL and the NFLPA.173  The court held that 
knowledge of the provision combined with the NFLPA’s waiver of the right to 
sue the NFL contained in the NFL CBA made it “clear that the union and the 
NFL reached an agreement with respect to how the eligibility rules would be 
handled.”174  This is simply a reformulation of the third prong of the Mackey 
test—the restraint at issue must be the product of bona fide arm’s length  
bargaining.  Despite Judge Sotomayor’s repudiation of the Mackey test in 
                                                          
167. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 134. 
168. Id. at 138. 
169. See generally Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 124. 
170. Id. at 133–34. 
171. Id. at 140–41. 
172. The 2011 NFL CBA explicitly includes the modern eligibility rules.  See NFL CBA supra note 
9 and accompanying text.  
173. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 142. 
174. Id. at 142. 
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Clarett, she in fact employed it. 
Whether Mackey is directly applied or an altered formulation of Mackey is 
used, the Second Circuit improperly applied the applicable exemption  
principles.  The Mackey decision held that, if any one of the three elements of 
the test was not met, the exemption would be denied and antitrust liability was 
possible.175  Therefore, even if the Clarett opinion was correct that the eligibility 
rules were the product of good faith bargaining, the exemption should be denied 
if the restraint affected parties outside of the bargaining relationship or the  
eligibility rules were not mandatory subjects of bargaining.176     
As noted above, the Clarett opinion stated that the Mackey test was only 
applicable when the restraint affected the competition in the product market, not 
the labor market.177  The district court in Clarett spoke in Mackey’s terms by 
concluding that prospective players were outside of the bargaining relationship, 
and therefore the first requirement of the Mackey test was not satisfied.178   
Although they reached different results on the exemption’s applicability, both 
opinions focused on the relationship between a prospective player and the  
bargaining unit.  The district court held that Clarett was outside of the  
bargaining unit,179 while the court of appeals held that the restraint at issue only 
affected the labor market.180  Judge Sotomayor concluded 
 
[t]his is simply not a case in which the NFL is alleged to have 
conspired with its players union to drive its competitors out of 
the market for professional football. . . . Nor does Clarett  
contend that the NFL uses the eligibility rules as an unlawful 
means of maintaining its dominant position in that market.181 
 
Regardless, however, of which result is correct,182 both opinions neglect the 
                                                          
175. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615–18 (8th Cir. 1976).  The Mackey v. NFL court denied the  
exemption because the Rozelle Rule was not the product of good faith bargaining.  Id. at 616.  Even 
though the first two prongs were met, the players still won.  Id. at 623. 
176. This Article assumes that the eligibility rules were the product of bona fide, good faith  
bargaining.  Even if such a conclusion was incorrect in Clarett, the inclusion of the eligibility rules in 
both the current NFL CBA and NBA CBA justify the propriety of such an assumption. 
177. No Supreme Court case explicitly makes such a distinction between the labor and product 
market  
regarding the exemption.  Milstein, supra note 8, at 234. 
178. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 395–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
179. See id. 
180. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2004). 
181. Id. (citations omitted) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 
(1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 809 (1945)).  
182. The Author believes the district court has the more persuasive argument on this issue.  
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most important issue posed by the eligibility rule—the relationship between the 
NFL (and the NBA) and the NCAA.  By focusing on Clarett’s relationship to 
the NFL, the district court failed to see that the parties affected outside the  
bargaining unit were also the NCAA and potential competitors to the NFL.  The 
court of appeals did not understand that the eligibility rule impacts the product 
market because the rule benefits college football and strengthens the NFL’s  
ability to foreclose entry-level competition.  In the language of Jewel Tea, the 
case cited by Judge Sotomayor as controlling, the eligibility restraints are “at 
the behest of . . . [a] non-labor group[]” and therefore the exemption should not 
apply.183 
The eligibility rule supports the current revenue structure of college  
football and basketball.   By keeping stars in college for either three years  
(football) or one year (basketball), college teams have increased ticket prices, 
sold record amounts of merchandise, and signed multi-billion dollar media  
contracts.184  Much of this ever-increasing revenue stream would be imperiled 
if the best football and basketball players were not forced to attend college.   
Financial concerns are at least one of the reasons why the NCAA consistently 
pressures the NBA to increase the mandated years in college from one to two or 
three years.185  The NCAA is, in Mackey terms, an outsider to the collective 
bargaining relationship and, in Clarett terms, an entity in the product, not the 
labor, market.  
Why would the NFL and the NBA want to protect the financial stability of 
the NCAA, an organization with which they are not affiliated?  The NCAA 
serves as the equivalent of baseball’s minor leagues for both sports, but with the 
added benefit of handing to each league players who are already stars.  The 
increased media attention to both the NFL and the NBA drafts affirms the  
importance of having players enter the leagues who are already famous.186  In 
addition, the NFL and the NBA do not incur the costs of running a full minor 
league developmental system as Major League Baseball teams are required to 
do.187  This arrangement is particularly important to the NFL because the risk of 
                                                          
183. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 
U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965). 
184. See, e.g., Eric Chemi, The Amazing Growth in College Football Revenues, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
27, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-09-26/the-amazing-growth-in-college-foot-
ball-revenues. 
185. New, supra note 15. 
186. See Ed Sherman, ESPN’s Chris Berman Has Seen NFL Draft’s Popularity Soar, CHI. TRIB. 
(Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/columnists/ct-nfl-draft-espn-sherman-media-
spt-0427-20150426-column.html. 
187. The NBA does support the “D-League” for developmental players.  NBA Development League: 
DLeague FAQs, NBA D-LEAGUE, http://www.nba.com/dleague/santacruz/dleague_faqs.html (last  
visited June 9, 2016).  The D-League is not a true minor league in that star or even good NBA players 
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a debilitating injury in three years of college football is significant.188  If the 
NFL had its own minor league system, the teams would be paying signing  
bonuses and salaries to players for three years after high school graduation.  If 
a player was injured during that period, the team would absorb the financial loss.  
If a player gets hurt in college under the current system, the medical costs are 
borne by the school, the job risk is on the player, and there are no economic 
consequences for the NFL teams.189  Financially stable college football and  
basketball programs therefore significantly lower costs for both the NFL and 
the NBA and save them millions of dollars in risk avoidance.  Both of these 
financial benefits increase the profitability of teams in each league.  Being 
handed pre-made marketable stars also increases the revenue of both leagues.190 
In classic economic and antitrust theory, higher profits and increasing  
revenue by a monopolist should produce entry-level competition that reduces 
prices and enhances efficiency.191  In professional football and basketball, lower 
costs and increased revenue means that both the NFL and the NBA have more 
money to spend on player salaries and related costs and practice and playing 
facilities.  Higher player salaries and better facilities create ever higher barriers 
to entry-level competition.  Despite an enormous increase in the profitability 
and market value of all NFL and NBA teams in the last two decades, no new 
professional league in either sport has arisen to challenge the NFL and NBA’s 
respective monopoly.  Instead, ticket prices and media payments in both sports 
increase annually and, correspondingly, the monopolists in each league get 
wealthier. In part because of the alliance with the NCAA, entry-level  
competition in professional football or basketball is cost prohibitive. These  
results are inconsistent with the goals of federal antitrust law.192 
The current arrangement therefore incentivizes the NFL, the NBA, the 
NFLPA, and the National Basketball Association Players Association 
(NBAPA) to continue the restrictive eligibility rules already in place, or, in the 
case of professional basketball, make them more restrictive.  Both the  
universities and the leagues profit enormously from the current eligibility rules.  
The only people injured by this structure are the prospective players like Clarett.  
                                                          
never appear in it.  The D-League is designed for players hoping to become fringe players in the NBA.  
See id. 
188. See, e.g., Jeffrey Perkel, High School, College Football Comes with Risk, ABC NEWS (Mar. 
23, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Healthday/story?id=4508074&page=1. 
189. Milstein supra note 8, at 226.  The article notes that “Major League Baseball teams each spend  
[approximately $9] million annually [on] their minor league” affiliates.  Id. 
190. See, e.g., Tim Tebow Is Slightly Less Marketable Than Oprah, but Is a Slightly Better  
Quarterback, YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 27, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-shutdown-cor-
ner/tim-tebow-slightly-less-marketable-oprah-slightly-better-213040534.html. 
191. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 525 (2004). 
192. See id. 
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The prospective players alone bear the risk of injury and the loss of three years 
or one year worth of income.  The lost income is particularly injurious to  
football players who have a much shorter professional life.193  Given the limited 
time in which a professional athlete is at his peak, the players can never recover 
the income they have lost.   
Judge Sotomayor’s statement at the conclusion of the Clarett opinion is 
therefore simply wrong.  Clarett is a case in which the NFL conspired with the 
players’ union to drive competitors out of the market for professional football.  
Clarett is a case in which the NFL was using unlawful means to maintain its 
dominant position in the market of professional football.  In that context,  
federal antitrust policies trump incidental labor law benefits.194  The exemption 
should have been denied for failing the first requirement of the Mackey test or 
for its impact on both the labor and the product market, depending on which 
language is preferred.  Clarett alleged a conspiracy to restrain trade that  
extended well beyond player wages.195  Exemption is inappropriate for restraints 
that have significant impact in the product market even if they also have an 
impact in the labor market.196  
In addition, both the district court and the court of appeals agreed that the 
eligibility rule must be a mandatory subject of bargaining for the exemption to 
apply.  The district court found that the eligibility rule was not such a mandatory 
subject because it did not address wages, hours, or terms and conditions of  
employment.197  The court noted that the rules made a class of players  
unemployable while mandatory subjects of bargaining apply only to those who 
are employed or eligible for employment.198  Wood, Caldwell, and Williams all 
involved employed or drafted players and were therefore cited as consistent with 
the district court’s distinction.199  The court of appeals held that the eligibility 
rule was a mandatory subject of bargaining.200  The opinion noted that the  
                                                          
193. Nick Schwartz, The Average Career Earnings of Athletes Across America’s Major Sports Will 
Shock You, FOR THE WIN (Oct. 24, 2013), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/10/average-career-earnings-
nfl-nba-mlb-nhl-mls.  Current thinking is that a football running back only has so many carries in his 
body, counting his collegiate and professional athletic life. Neil Greenberg, Running Backs’ NFL  
Careers Are Getting Shorter and Their Impact Lessened, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2015), http://ftw.usato-
day.com/2013/10/average-career-earnings-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl-mls. 
194. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,  
625–26 (1975). 
195. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
196. See Connell Construction Co., 421 U.S. at 622–23; Am Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 
7, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Workers, 536 F.3d 68, 79 (1st Cir. 2008). 
197. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393–95. 
198. Id. at 393. 
199. Id. at 394–95. 
200. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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eligibility rule had a tangible effect on the wages of current NFL players because 
they are part of a complex scheme by which individual salaries in the NFL are 
determined.201  The eligibility rules could therefore not be viewed in isolation 
because they were part of the economic assumptions that supported the entire 
NFL CBA.202  The opinion concluded by noting that the eligibility rule  
diminished a veteran player’s risk of being replaced by either a drafted rookie 
or an undrafted rookie free agent.203 
The rationales given by Judge Sotomayor to support her conclusion that the 
eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining again reveal a  
misunderstanding of how the NFL actually works.  As noted previously, the 
number of drafted rookies is determined by the CBA itself.204  The number of 
undrafted rookie free agents is effectively defined by the ninety-player limit on 
training camp rosters placed on each team.  These limits are consistently  
applied regardless of the number of players eligible for the draft.  The effect of 
additional players eligible for the draft is only to increase marginally (1) the 
time and money a team spends on scouting prospective players and (2) the  
number of eligible players invited to the NFL Combine.  Judge Sotomayor’s 
second rationale is therefore misplaced.  Precluding Clarett from eligibility does 
not diminish the risk a veteran player faces of being replaced by a rookie.  The 
veteran is going to face the exact same number of rookies competing for his job 
regardless of the size of the eligibility pool.  The only argument that supports 
the rationale is that, even though the numbers are the same, the quality of the 
rookie player pool is reduced by eligibility restrictions and veterans would face 
lessened competition from such less gifted players.  However, such talent  
disparities are a fact of life under the current eligibility rule as the pool of  
prospective players are labeled in some years as “strong” and other years as 
“weak.”205  If the eligibility rule was declared an antitrust violation, the talent 
disparity would be most likely to occur in the first year of expanded eligibility 
and would then return to the normal ebb and flow of annual talent assessment.  
The infrequency of such a quality reduction occurring beyond the current norm 
if the eligibility pool was expanded renders it of marginal utility in the  
assessment of whether the eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining.  
Judge Sotomayor’s second rationale does not support her conclusion in this  
regard.    
The opinion’s first rationale also does not support its conclusion that the 
                                                          
201. Id. at 140. 
202. Id.  The complexity argument is unpersuasive.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
203. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 140. 
204. Supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
205. See, e.g., RedRev, 2016 NBA Draft Class Preview, PEACHTREE HOOPS (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://www.peachtreehoops.com/2015/10/1/9421155/2016-nba-draft-class-preview-atlanta-hawks. 
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eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining.  The salary caps contained 
in the NFL CBA in force at the time of the Clarett decision were in effect total 
team caps.  The rationale therefore had more validity then as higher rookie  
compensation, at least hypothetically, took a larger percentage of the available 
cap available to veterans.  In fact, however, the rookie salaries frequently  
increased veteran compensation as the teams struggled to justify paying  
unproven players more than established NFL stars.  During the period those 
earlier NFL CBAs were in effect, veteran player salaries increased every year.206  
However, even if an increase in veterans’ wages is considered an effect of the 
rookie salaries permitted by the CBA in effect at the time of Clarett, the effect 
had nothing to do with the eligibility rule.  Rookie compensation at that time 
was determined by NFL revenue (which determined the team salary cap) and 
the draft position of the individual player.  The size or quality of the pool from 
which players were drafted did not influence general rookie compensation or, 
by cause and effect, veteran wages. 
The rationale employed by Judge Sotomayor has even less validity in  
today’s NFL.  The current CBA—the 2011 NFL CBA—provides in detail for a 
Total Rookie Compensation Pool and a Year-One Rookie Compensation Pool 
for both the entire NFL and for each individual team.207   These amounts are 
annually determined by a detailed process contained within the CBA.208  As part 
of those calculations, each pick in the draft is given a suggested  
compensation number and undrafted free agent compensation is regulated in 
detail.209  These cap limits completely divorce the rookie compensation  
packages from the amount of money available to veterans.  These rookie  
compensation restrictions are also completely unrelated to the number of  
players eligible for the draft.  If the eligibility rules were invalidated and more 
players were eligible for the draft, the amount of the rookie caps would not  
increase by $1.  The rationale was not persuasive when written.  Its logic  
cannot be justified under current NFL and NBA conditions.  The district court 
in Clarett was correct in its assertion that a rule rendering someone  
unemployable cannot be included within a subject that only relates to those  
employed.210  The eligibility rule is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.  The 
restriction is a group collaboration between the leagues, the unions, and the 
NCAA to maintain profits and a monopoly position in the professional football 
market by restraining trade.  
                                                          
206. See Mike J. Perry, Rising Income Inequality and the NFL Part 2, AEIDEAS (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.aei.org/publication/rising-income-inequality-and-the-nfl-part-2/. 
207. NFL CBA, supra note 9, art 7 § (1)(c)–(d). 
208. Id. 
209. See id. art 7. 
210. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 393–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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VI.  IF THE EXEMPTION DOES NOT APPLY, THE ELIGIBILITY RULES VIOLATE 
SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT  
If the exemption is inapplicable, the validity of the restraints would again 
be suspect pursuant to the reasoning in Haywood.  The district court was  
correct in holding that, if the exemption did not apply, section 1 of the Sherman 
Act would only be violated if Clarett proved that he suffered an appropriate 
antitrust injury and that the eligibility rule was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.211  “Antirust injury” means that Clarett must have sustained an injury the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent, caused by the defendants’ unlawful  
activity.212  The Supreme Court has also indicated that an unreasonable restraint 
in the sports industry needed to be proven under the Rule of Reason analysis.213  
The per se rule of liability was inappropriate in sports given the uniqueness of 
the industry and its particular need for joint or group activity to exist.214 
Clarett had an antitrust injury because he alleged a group boycott that  
created a barrier to entry in the labor market.215  He is not claiming that he was 
harmed because he lost his job in a competitive environment.  The eligibility 
“[r]ule[s] preclude[d] Clarett from entering into [a] ‘fair and vigorous  
competition’” for employment.216  He properly identified the relevant market as 
the NFL labor market for player services.217  The district court concluded  
“Clarett’s own injury—his inability to compete in the market—stems from  
defendant’s activities.”218  Clarett therefore satisfied the Supreme Court’s  
criteria for antitrust standing and injury.  If the argument noted above that the 
restraint affects both the labor and the product market is accepted, the required 
antitrust injury is even clearer. 
Clarett also properly alleged an unreasonable restraint of trade pursuant to 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The eligibility rule was clearly the product of 
concerted or group activity by the thirty-two teams of the NFL, with at least the 
tacit approval of the NFLPA.219  Therefore, section 1’s requirement of concerted 
action between at least two legally distinct entities was satisfied.220  Although a 
group boycott is normally a per se violation of section 1, because history has 
                                                          
211. Id. at 403–04. 
212. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
213. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–03 (1984). 
214. Id. at 100–01. 
215. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d. at 399. 
216. Id. at 401. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 403. 
219. Clarett v. NFL (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 134–37 (2d Cir. 2004). 
220. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 404. 
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proven that they are overwhelmingly likely to be anticompetitive, the district 
court properly employed the Rule of Reason test required by Board of Regents 
in the context of the sports industry.221  Under that analysis, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that the restraint at issue has an adverse effect on competition 
in the relevant market.222  If the plaintiff satisfies this obligation, the burden is 
on the defendants to prove that procompetitive benefits of the restraint outweigh 
the anticompetitive effects.223  If the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff 
may show that the defendants’ procompetitive effects could have been produced 
by less restrictive alternatives that would produce no or less anticompetitive  
impact.224 
Clarett easily satisfied his burden of proving an adverse effect on  
competition because, even at common law, an agreement that precluded an  
individual from practicing his chosen profession was invalid in the absence of 
some form of compensation.225  “Age-based eligibility restrictions in  
professional sports are anticompetitive because they limit competition in the 
player personnel market by excluding sellers.”226   The district court therefore 
focused its attention on the NFL’s four pro-competitive benefits of the  
eligibility rule—protecting less mature players from the greater risk of injury in 
NFL games, protecting the NFL’s product from the adverse consequences from 
such injuries, protecting the NFL clubs from the costs and potential liabilities 
of such injuries, and protecting from injury and self-abuse adolescents who 
might over train or use performance-enhancing drugs to play sooner in the 
NFL.227  The district court dismissed out of hand the first and fourth of the  
benefits by concluding that although they were laudable concerns, they had 
nothing to do with promoting competition.228  Therefore, they did not qualify as 
pro-competitive benefits.229  The second and third benefits were also  
unpersuasive.230  Cost savings manifested themselves in the product market, not 
the labor market.231  Their impact was therefore irrelevant in the labor market 
                                                          
221. Id. at 404–05. 
222. Id. at 404.  
223. Id. at 405.  
224. Id. at 405–06. 
225. Such agreements are usually found in the context of covenants not to compete.  See generally 
Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement 
of Employee Covenants Not to Compete—A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531 (1984). 
226. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
227. Id. at 408. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 408–09.  
231. Id. at 409.  The NFL’s cost savings justifications under the Rule of Reason test effectively 
confirm that the exemption should be denied because it has effects beyond the labor market.  Id.; see 
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alleged by Clarett.232  In addition, a group boycott that keeps costs down is  
almost always cited as an adverse impact on the relevant market.233 The district 
court refused to accept that an anticompetitive restraint could somehow be 
turned into a pro-competitive benefit.234  “Indeed, the vast majority of  
anticompetitive policies are instituted because they will be profitable to the  
violators.”235  
The district court concluded by noting that the pro-competitive benefits, if 
any, of the eligibility rules could be accomplished by less restrictive  
alternatives.236  If the pro-competitive effects are all based on a concern that 
younger players are not physically or mentally ready to play in the NFL, age is 
“a poor proxy” for being ready to play in the NFL.237  Because such readiness 
is concededly a case-by-case decision, medical examinations and tests that 
measure an individual’s maturity are better ways to determine a player’s  
ability to be successful in the NFL.238  The NFL was, in fact, already performing 
such examinations and tests in their extensive efforts to provide the teams with 
the most complete information possible to assist in their decision whether a  
prospect was worth selecting in the draft.  The district court properly granted 
Clarett’s motion for summary judgment, declared the eligibility rules to be a 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and ordered that Clarett was eligible 
to participate in the 2004 NFL draft.239   
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The right to pursue a useful occupation has been a cherished right from the 
beginnings of America.240  Judge Sotomayor deprived collegiate football and 
basketball players of that right in an opinion that was wrong when it was  
written and more inappropriate in the modern world of professional sports.  
Clarett incorrectly applied the law it cited as relevant.  The cases employed in 
the opinion properly establish that some multi-employer group activity is  
exempt from antitrust liability.  Judge Sotomayor essentially derived from those 
holdings that all multi-employer group activity is exempt from an antitrust  
lawsuit by a labor group if it relates to a mandatory subject of bargaining.  Such 
                                                          
also supra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.  
232. Id.  
233. Id. at 399.  
234. Id. at 409.  
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 410.  
237. Id.  
238. Id. 
239. See id. at 410–11. 
240. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
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an expansion is unprecedented, especially when applied to prospective players 
who are not members of the union, not employees of the NFL, and not members 
of the bargaining unit.  In addition, the eligibility rule is not a mandatory subject 
of bargaining because it is unrelated to wages, hours, or terms and conditions of 
employees. 
Clarett also errs in its failure to assess the relationship between the NFL and 
college football.  The eligibility rule supports monopoly profits for both the NFL 
and the universities of Division I of the NCAA.  At the same time, the rule is a 
barrier to entry-level competition in the market of professional football.  No 
other case has ever permitted such a blatant violation of the Sherman Act to 
escape antitrust liability through the non-statutory labor law exemption.  In such 
a context, antitrust policies and goals must outweigh the labor law interests, if 
any, that are relevant. 
Finally, the Clarett result is particularly egregious if it is applied to the  
modern NFL or NBA.  Under the current collective bargaining agreements in 
both leagues, rookies cannot affect veteran wages and the size of the draft  
eligibility pool cannot affect veteran job security.  Finally, rookie compensation 
in the NFL and NBA has escalated dramatically since 2004.  Forcing a  
prospective player to miss up to three years of NFL income or one year of NBA 
income costs him millions of dollars he can never recoup.  The modern impact 
of the Clarett decision permits the members of the group boycott to make  
hundreds of millions of dollars in monopoly profits at the expense of  
prospective players.  The eligibility rule should be declared a violation of  
section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the common law right of all Americans to 
pursue an occupation of their choice should be reaffirmed. 
 
